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Abstract 
 
In 2018, random mandatory alcohol screening became a reality of the Canadian justice system. 
Before the law had even come into effect, it was being welcomed with open arms by some, and 
immediately castigated as unconstitutional by others. Compelling arguments for both sides have 
emerged in the wake of debate. Where Bill C-46 has enacted laws which have adversely affected 
the rights of drivers, an analysis of the new laws written within the Canadian Criminal Code, 
warrant an audit of their alignment with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This 
thesis challenges the constitutionality of section 320.27 (2) of the Canadian Criminal Code 
against sections 7 and 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In drawing on the 
public’s perception of the law, an array of precedent provided by the Supreme Court of Canada, 
and an analysis of both sections 7 and 1 of the Canadian Charter, an argument can be made 
which corroborates the notion that section 320.27 (2) of the Canadian Criminal Code is 
unconstitutional.   
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 Random mandatory alcohol screening in the context of conveyances and its introduction 
into Canadian society have, in the last year or so, been a hot topic of debate. Although the 
enactment of such laws may be accompanied by the purist of intentions backing them, people’s 
civil liberties are at stake and the debate’s focus surrounds this dilemma, exactly. Some are not 
fazed by Parliament’s requirement that the public relinquish their civil liberties in the name of 
collective insurance. Meanwhile, others castigate the newly passed laws as unquestionably 
unconstitutional and claim that the laws deny Canadians a right in which they should not have to 
give up.  
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in section 7, grants Canadians the right to 
life, liberty, and security of the person… except in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice. The contention that this right is being infringed on is not a defective argument, rather it is 
backed by years of precedent, a magnitude of research, and an array of endorsed appraisal of the 
law and its implementation. It will prove as useful to analyze the new mandatory alcohol 
screening law(s) up against section 7 of the Charter. By understanding the modifications made to 
the law as enabled by Bill C-46, the law’s overall objectives, and the public’s perception of the 
law, an examination of the basic facts surrounding section 7 of the Charter in conjunction with 
the new mandatory alcohol screening laws can be made. This analysis will seek to discern as to 
whether or not the new random mandatory alcohol screening law infringes on section 7 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. If this is found to be true, is the law a “reasonable 
limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society” as 
stipulated by section 1 of the Charter? 
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Within section 7 of the Charter, the rights to life, liberty, security, and the concept of 
principles of fundamental justice are all explored separately. Furthermore, an argument is 
established where section 1 of the Charter is put into motion as a potential challenge to the right 
and freedoms granted by the Charter. An exploration of the facts surrounding R v Oakes [1986] 
and the Oakes Test work to aid the overall analysis of the new law in the context of the Charter.  
 
Methodology  
 
 In order to draw an educated inference about whether the new random mandatory alcohol 
screening law is constitutional, it will prove as effective to adhere as closely as possible to the 
discourse that the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has maintained which is associated with 
section 7 and 1 issues relating to the Charter. Because the SCC’s methods of reaching a decision 
are binding in Canadian law, an attempt to analyze the potential infringements will coincide as 
closely as possible with the approaches that the SCC would apply in reaching a decision. 
However, the thesis does not read like a SCC decision because concepts are broken down and 
examined in great detail in order to demonstrate their relevance to the overall question. Section 7 
and section 1 tests for Charter analysis are utilized based upon case law precedent. Meanwhile, 
relevant secondary sources are used to corroborate any presuppositions made relating to the 
potential infringements. SCC jurisprudence relating to section 7 and 1 of the Charter were 
retrieved through databases such as CanLii and the Supreme Court of Canada’s website Lexum. 
Secondary sources which were used to authenticate conclusions made about the potential 
infringements included journal articles, books, governmental reports, blogs produced by legal 
practitioners, and news articles. These were retrieved from databases such as ProQuest, Sage 
Journals, JSTOR, Google Scholar, Statistics Canada, The Canadian Department of Justice, and 
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CanLii Docs. The conclusions in this thesis are based on the pool of data available within these 
sources and databases. The argument presented in this thesis is not absolute but is posed as a 
potential reasoning to back the contention that random mandatory alcohol screening may be 
unconstitutional. 
 
The Law 
 
 December 18th, 2018 marked the day police officers Canada-wide stopped forgetting their 
screening devices at the station before getting into their cruisers. In June of that year, the 
Canadian Parliament passed legislation (Bill C-46) providing law enforcement officers with 
considerably more discretionary privileges when it came to motor vehicle offences and 
investigation matters relating to the operation of conveyances while under the influence of 
alcohol and drugs. With respects to learning as to whether or not the new laws are 
unconstitutional there are a few concepts which need to be analyzed and understood about the 
law. Firstly, the contrasts between the 2017 version of the law and the most recent amendment 
which now comprise the newly enforced sections 320.27 (1) and 320.27 (2); secondly the 
reasons why the law was amended to provide these new, pervasive powers to law enforcement 
officers; and thirdly, the public’s attitude concerning the new law (i.e. is it a legitimate use of 
force in the eyes of an organized society?).  
 
Sections 254 (2) – 254 (6) 
 The December 2017 version of the Canadian Criminal Code (C.C.C.) would be the last 
version (for some time at least) to offer “reasonable grounds” as a precondition for requesting a 
mandatory breathe sample from Canadian drivers. This “reasonable grounds” is in essence the 
pivotal principle in wording which has mightily altered the discourse of police influence and 
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arguably even, police obtrusiveness. To contemplate the significance of two words, just two 
words, on the impact of the entire law and how it is practiced is profoundly thought-provoking. 
The archived sections that play as compatible with the newer C.C.C. sections which are being 
contemplated as constitutional, are as follows:  
254 (2) – If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has 
alcohol or a drug in their body and that the person has, within the preceding three 
hours, operated a motor vehicle or vessel, operated or assisted in the operation of 
an aircraft or railway equipment or had the care or control of a motor vehicle, a 
vessel, an aircraft or railway equipment, whether it was in motion or not, the 
peace officer may, by demand, require the person to comply with paragraph (a), in 
the case of a drug, or with either or both of paragraphs (a) and (b), in the case of 
alcohol: 
(a) to perform forthwith physical coordination tests prescribed by regulation to 
enable the peace officer to determine whether a demand may be made under 
subsection (3) or (3.1) and, if necessary, to accompany the peace officer for that 
purpose; and 
(b) to provide forthwith a sample of breath that, in the peace officer’s opinion, 
will enable a proper analysis to be made by means of an approved screening 
device and, if necessary, to accompany the peace officer for that purpose; and  
254 (3) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person is 
committing, or at any time within the preceding three hours has committed, an 
offence under section 253 as a result of the consumption of alcohol, the peace 
officer may, by demand made as soon as practicable, require the person 
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(a) to provide, as soon as practicable, 
(i) samples of breath that, in a qualified technician’s opinion, will enable a proper 
analysis to be made to determine the concentration, if any, of alcohol in the 
person’s blood, or 
(ii) if the peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that, because of their 
physical condition, the person may be incapable of providing a sample of breath 
or it would be impracticable to obtain a sample of breath, samples of blood that, in 
the opinion of the qualified medical practitioner or qualified technician taking the 
samples, will enable a proper analysis to be made to determine the concentration, 
if any, of alcohol in the person’s blood; and 
(b) if necessary, to accompany the peace officer for that purpose. (Canadian 
Criminal Code, 1985).  
Section 254 (2)’s most recent amendments (which are now found under section 320.27 of 
the C.C.C.) include changing terms such as “motor vehicle, vessel, railway equipment, or 
aircraft” to the overarching term “conveyances,” which by definition, as noted in section 320.11 
of the C.C.C., “means a motor vehicle, a vessel, an aircraft or railway equipment” (Canadian 
Criminal Code, 1985). To remark as to whether or not the conveyance is in motion or not, is now 
an obsolete notion because of the three-hour grace time provided to police officers to perform 
any of the detection methods as granted by section 320.28 (1) (Canadian Criminal Code, 1985). 
More importantly, the decriminalization of marijuana, as likely being the most gravitational 
catalyst for amending these laws, has for that sake, given peace officers the right to demand 
samples of bodily substances, which in the previous version, was not a characteristic of the law.  
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The former section 254(3) bare some faint changes – again relating to the substituting term 
“conveyances” and a few other discrete terminology changes. However, the real modification to 
the law, which has become the impetus for controversy and debate surrounding the topic is the 
newly developed section 320.27 (2). This section provides an unhampered authority to peace 
officers to administer mandatory alcohol screening tests as they please.  
 
320.27 (2) If a peace officer has in his or her possession an approved screening 
device, the peace officer may, in the course of the lawful exercise of powers under 
an Act of Parliament or an Act of a provincial legislature or arising at common 
law, by demand, require the person who is operating a motor vehicle to 
immediately provide the samples of breath that, in the peace officer’s opinion, are 
necessary to enable a proper analysis to be made by means of that device and to 
accompany the peace officer for that purpose (Canadian Criminal Code, 1985). 
 
A pervasive misconception in Canadian law is that a police officer needs reasonable 
grounds to pull you over in the first place. This is in fact not true. Since 1990, in R v Ladouceur, 
[1990] the SCC decided that stopping vehicles randomly, was constitutional. Peace officers have 
long had the right to pull a vehicle over at random to check for proper documentation, 
mechanical soundness, etc. The SCC essentially concluded that to drive a motor vehicle is not a 
right but, a privilege and for the purpose of ensuring everyone’s safety on the roads, peace 
officers are given a fair bit of authority on the roads in comparison to other police endeavours. R 
v Ladouceur, [1990] is broken down further in the discussion as to whether or not section 320.27 
(2) infringes section 7 of the Charter. Section 320.27 (2) marks a significant change in police 
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conduct. The question at your driver-side window now becomes “can I see your licence, 
registration, proof of insurance? Oh… and blow into this.”   
 
Bill C-46  
Bill C-46 became the legal authority for section 320.27 (2). The legislation succinctly 
defends its purpose and provides a number of reasons as to why the law changed. There is value 
in defining some of these reasons because when deciding the constitutionality of a law, we need 
to equip ourselves with an understanding of the law’s connection to its intended function and 
moreover, we need to gain insight as to whether or not the law is arbitrary, disproportionate, 
vague, etc. which ties in later to the principles of fundamental justice. There are a multitude of 
reasons as to why the law was passed, and Parliament shares some of these in the preamble of 
the Bill. (1) To save lives and reduce injury; (2) to deter the public from driving under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs; and (3) to leverage detection opportunity of impaired driving 
through better equipping law enforcement officers (Bill C-46, 2018).  
 Methods to deter unsafe behaviours (such as impaired driving) and for the purpose of 
public protection, are reasons which are usually safe to justify when passing a law. As long as 
the law truly works to corroborate those reasons, the law has a fair chance of holding-up in court. 
Equipping peace officers with more power and simplifying the law aren’t necessarily guarded 
goals of a law (principles of fundamental justice). The preamble in Bill C-46 does establish that 
the law gives police more flexibility in screening and investigative powers. However, the 
legislation asserts that these new authorities are consistent with Charter. This is undoubtably the 
one question that needs to be answered in this piece and is related to this reason as supplemented 
by Parliament. Do the interests of society related to individual autonomy, privacy and protection, 
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and inherently personal choices balance with the state’s goals related to controlling disorder and 
the regulation of conduct by means of implementing this law? To kick-start this discussion, it 
will be of value to gauge public perception in light of the changes to the law.  
 
Public Perceptions 
 It would be fair to say, that Canadians are likely split down the middle in terms of their 
support for the law. One quick Google search of “mandatory breathalysing” presents an 
abundance of search results, mainly news stories, either condoning the change, or disputing it. 
Proponents of the law can often be those negatively affected by the calamities of which impaired 
driving can result in. These groups of people find a sense of reconciliation in the new law. As 
either an agent of vindictive attitudes towards those who drive impaired or as promise for a 
futuristic reduction in catastrophes, the law has many in support of its overall goals and 
functions. For example, Mothers Against Drunk Driving Canada (MADD) have been vocal 
enthusiasts of the law. With assertions that “it’s a new enforcement tool [which will] prevent 
crashes, deaths, and injuries” and claims that it will “save thousands of lives each year,” MADD 
Canada has shown a great amount of support for the law (MADD Canada, n.d., para. 2).  
 In opposition to this attitude, a similar number of people have expressed their 
reservations about the new law. The privileges it gives peace officers, alarm some civil rights 
activists who have expressed that the new law infringes on people’s constitutional rights as 
granted by the Charter. Many of these activists are lawyers who assert that the change in law is 
invasive and permit peace officers to go on “fishing expeditions” (CBC News, 2018, para. 7). To 
some this might be an overstatement, however, the premise of the argument on behalf of civil 
rights activists is not found to be faulty. ‘Poaching’ has no doubt become a habitual practice for 
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law enforcement officers with their new concession. And this should raise some flags – to search 
and seek out people who are in no way conspicuously defying the law make’s many individuals 
feel violated and uncomfortable. These are the perceptions we need to consider when analyzing 
the integrity of the law.   
    
Introduction to Section 7 of the Charter 
Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms reads as follows:  
“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the 
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles 
of fundamental justice.” 
Upon first glance, this section comes off as a daunting interpretation exercise. It’s 
immensely ambiguous because in some fashion, we’re looking at three individual rights provided 
by one colossal section. There are four key terms that need to be pulled out of the section and 
analyzed in conjunction with the Supreme Court of Canada’s understanding and interpretation of 
them. “Life, liberty, and security” are undoubtedly three integral pieces of the whole. Moreover, 
the phrase “principles of fundamental justice” is equally weighted in importance and must also 
be understood.  
We can safely assume that one’s “life” is not necessarily threatened by the enforcement 
of Section 320.27 (2). If anything, the law enforced by this section is mechanism by which 
parliament seeks to protect “life.” Although, the “life” component of this Charter section bares 
little significance in the context of learning as to whether or not Section 320.27 (2) infringes on 
Section 7 of the Charter, each element within the provision apprises the overall purpose of the 
section.  
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“Life”  
The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) establishes that “life” is the “right not to die” (Carter v 
Canada, 2015 SCC 5 at para 61). The SCC provides a fairly unequivocal characterization of 
when this Charter section is relevant. Referenced in the Chaoulli v. Quebec’s, [2005] Supreme 
Court case, the SCC recognized in Carter v Canada, [2015] that the right to life is discounted 
when an individual’s life is taken or otherwise threatened by a circumstance in which the 
governmental body has direct control over curbing that particular circumstance from occurring in 
the first place (para. 62). In other words, “the case law suggests that the right to life is engaged, 
where the law or state action imposes death or an increased risk of death on a person, either 
directly or indirectly” (Carter v Canada, 2015 SCC 5 at para 62).  
Examples of how this section apply are that of the cases aforementioned. Chauolli v Quebec, 
[2005] which preceded Carter v Canada, [2015] and also ended up substantiating Carter v 
Canada, [2015] spurred by an argument galvanized by Dr. Chauolli whom felt that laws in 
Quebec, associated with the Health Insurance Act (HEIA) and the Hospital Insurance Act 
(HOIA) were unconstitutional because the current legislation denied practioners the right to set 
up private practices which consequently affected an individual’s ability to obtain private health 
insurance. Essentially, the takeaway from this case is that the three judges who did concede there 
was an infringement on Dr. Chaoulli’s patients’ section 7 rights contended that prohibition of 
access to private health care while the public sector is failing to provide timely care, threatens 
one’s life because the initial impetus for accessing health care is very likely to worsen while care 
is halted during wait times.  
The SCC judges in Carter v Canada, [2015] recognized within the Chaoulli case that section 
7 is engaged, in the context of preserving or protecting life, when there is a threat to life. They 
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took this interpretation further by applying it to the very controversial topic of assisted suicide in 
Carter v Canada, [2015]. Carter argued that laws in the Canadian Criminal Code which 
prohibited assisted suicide and consensual death infringed her section 7 rights. The irony in 
someone exercising their right to “life” while simultaneously castigating laws which prohibit 
assisted suicide and consensual death is perplexing. However, the argument was underhanded 
and alleged that when there is no available option to carry out an assisted suicide, those who are 
terminally ill are at a higher risk of “prematurely” committing suicide while they are still 
capable, and not inhibited by their disease, disability, etc. once they get to an intolerable phase in 
living out their illness. The SSC notes that the right to live should not be confused with a “duty 
to live” (Carter v Canada, 2015 SCC 5 at para 63).  
 
“Liberty”  
 The concept of “liberty” is informed by a wide variety of precedent. “Liberty” is such an 
overarching and subjective term it demands a more encompassing criterion in order to solve its 
ambiguity. To attempt to abridge the means by which the SCC finally arrived at some sort of 
interpretation of the term “liberty” is difficult but, essentially, there are two “sub-rights” being 
protected by the right to live liberally. One is that of the protection against physical restraint such 
as imprisonment. The other is that of the protection against the impediment on personal 
autonomy and the “enjoy[ment of] individual dignity and independence” (Godbout v Longueuil, 
1997 SCR 844 at para 66).  
 The former is often contemplated by the courts as striking a balance between the 
punishment fitting the crime (a societal value) and liberties which shouldn’t arbitrarily be 
stripped (an individual value). A fair amount of this precedent has arisen from not criminally 
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responsible cases (NCR). For example, in R v Demers, [2004] the issue at point, was that of 
Criminal Code Sections 672.33, 672.54, and 672.81(1). Combined, these sections made it so that 
when an accused was deemed unfit to stand trial, there was no option for an absolute discharge. 
This was argued to impede on one’s liberties because being unfit to stand trial is not necessarily 
indicative of one being any danger to society. Essentially, one has to wait until they become fit to 
stand trial or until the Crown fails to build a prima facie case against them. The accused is not 
eligible for an absolute discharge until they go before a review board where the number of times 
which one is subject to go before a review board is indefinite. What it came down to for the SCC 
was that because review boards do not determine innocence, guilt, or dangerousness with 
respects to NCR accused, an accused who has not been tried cannot be deemed guilty and 
dangerous by a tribunal who has no such scope to decide that. Because of these notions, 
Demers’s liberties were considered to be infringed upon.  
 Other decisive cases in which the SCC recognized a section 7 infringement were that of R 
v Heywood, [1994] and May v Ferndale Institution, [2005]. Heywood challenged the 
constitutionality of Section 179 (1) of the C.C.C., which prohibited vagrancy only in 
consequence to committing acts which revolved mainly around pedophilia and child abuse. The 
old law read:  
[Everyone] commits vagrancy who having at any time been convicted of an 
offence under section 151, 152 or 153, subsection 160(3) or 173(2) or section 271, 
272 or 273, or of an offence under a provision referred to in paragraph (b) of the 
definition serious personal injury offence in section 687 of the Criminal Code, 
chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read before January 4, 
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1983, is found loitering in or near a school ground, playground, public park or 
bathing area. (Canadian Criminal Code, 1985) 
The SCC agreed that the law was overly broad. In the context of Section 7, the law’s objectives 
did infringe on one’s liberties more so than required in order to meet the underlying purpose of 
the law. By this, the Court meant that the law could be amended to meet its intended objective 
without extending as far as to impede so heavily on one’s rights. The SCC also found it 
unconstitutional, for the law permitted no such review in order to re-evaluate the necessity of the 
law through a case by case analysis.  
 In May v Ferndale Institution [2005], a new law was enacted which required that inmates 
whom were serving a lifetime sentence in a minimum-security prison and hadn’t completed their 
“violent offender programming” were to be re-evaluated in terms of security classifications. A 
group of offenders who were serving their life sentences in a minimum-security prison were 
transferred to a medium-security prison as a result of the changed law and were not at all 
transferred on the basis they had committed any kind of misconduct which might have triggered 
a transfer anyways. The group appealed on the grounds that this law infringed on their section 7 
Charter rights and the SCC concurred (to some extent). On the question of whether or not the 
new law was arbitrary, the SCC disagreed, stating that if the court found Corrections Canada in 
violation of section 7 for applying a new law, new laws would never hold. Nonetheless, the 
Court did find an infringement whereby Corrections Canada refused to share their scoring matrix 
with the inmates. The scoring matrix was the tool used to inform the decision as to whether or 
not Corrections Canada was going to transfer the inmates. This was considered in infringement 
on their liberty because it was noted that if one is unaware of what the scoring matrix entails, 
they are unfairly withheld the opportunity to attempt to meet those standards.  
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 Winko v British Columbia [1999], is another NCR case and is an excellent example of 
how personal liberties can only go as far as to satisfy public safety and societal values. This case 
also dealt with Section 672.54 of the CCC. The appellant claimed that this section was 
unconstitutional but, the SCC was not convinced. They ruled that the law was well-equipped 
with a reasonable balance to instruct those applying the law to consider “the least onerous and 
restrictive” sanction on behalf of the accused while considering public safety. The appeal was 
therefore dismissed.  
 Cunningham v Canada [1993], undertakes a similar legal issue. Cunningham was 
sentenced to 12 years imprisonment for committing manslaughter but, was to serve two-thirds of 
his sentence in prison and the other third was to be served in the community under mandatory 
supervision. During his prison sentence, the Parole Act was amended and permitted the 
Commissioner of Corrections, where they have reason to believe, on the basis of information 
obtained within six months leading up to the presumptive release date, that the inmate is likely, prior 
to the expiration of his sentence, to commit an offence causing death or serious harm. The inmate 
may, therefore, be sent before a Parole Board where the Parole board may decide to deny the inmate 
his or her release.  
 Cunningham, claiming that the amended Parole Act infringed on his section 7 rights, 
appealed to the SSC. His appeal was dismissed for similar reasons discussed in the Winko v British 
Columbia, [1999] case. Basically, the SCC concluded that the law again compromised on 
appreciating the offender’s rights, but only so as far as to not threaten the safety of the general 
public. Additionally, with its implementation, the law provided safeguards to the offender such as 
hearings, the right to be represented throughout those hearings, and the opportunity for future 
reviews on the case.   
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When it comes down to understanding “liberty” in the context of physical restraint, the 
Court has emphasized, especially in regard to the cases above, that “the [interest in exercising one’s 
right to liberty,] is limited only to the extent that this is shown to be necessary for the protection of 
the public” (Cunningham v Canada, 1993 2 SCR 143). It should be noted, that this principle is not 
abandoned in the context of “liberty” as a protectant of personal autonomy which, becomes 
apparent below.  
Possibly, our most underrated right is that of “liberty,” but in the context of personal 
autonomy. Many of us are cognizant of the fact that a peace officer (the state) can’t physically 
restrain us unless warranted. Despite that, we don’t often exercise that facet of the right to 
liberty. But, when we make decisions that our personal to us, such as whether or not we want to 
obtain an abortion; we want to go to school; we want to vaccinate our children; we want to sell 
our house; we want to open a business; we want to live here; and then move there, we are 
exercising our right liberty. Personal autonomy is at the core of humanness and is arguably, more 
so than others, a right that people are eminently attached to. Like stated above, the SCC must 
attain equilibrium in the quest to define liberty. Within the context of personal autonomy, we 
again notice that this is not an unfettered right. It has its bounds in the name of protecting society 
as a hole. This concept again, becomes something the courts deeply emphasize.  
The case of Godbout v Longueuil, [1997] encapsulates what it means to practice personal 
autonomy in an “organized society” (para. 66). Longueuil, a city in Quebec, made it unlawful for 
permeant city employees to reside outside of the city’s borders. Godbout, the appellant, worked 
with the local police as a radio operator. Godbout moved out of the city while still employed 
with the police and was subsequently terminated without notice (as contractually outlined upon 
her employment) after she refused to relocate back within the city limits. The SCC, in 
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referencing especially B. (R.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] and a 
couple of United States Supreme Court decisions, explicitly established that personal autonomy, 
like the right against personal restraint is protected under the “liberty” provision of the section 7 
right. R v Big M Drug Mart introduced this notion with its accorded definition of the term 
“freedom” which goes on to state that “liberty does not mean mere freedom from physical 
restraint. In a free and democratic society, the individual must be left room for personal 
autonomy to live his or her own life and to make decisions that are of fundamental personal 
importance” (R v Big M Drug Mart, 1985 1 SCR 295). The SCC, in Godbout v Longueuil, 
[1997] employed this definition to assemble an understanding of what the right to personal 
autonomy is, and the extent in which it can be exercised before it impedes on the “principles of 
fundamental justice” or disrupts the protections of the common good in an organized society. 
The right to choose a private residency, as contended by the Court, is not an inherently private 
choice which would cause grave societal turmoil or in that effect, really impact at all, the 
continuance of the enjoyment of an organized society for all. In any fashion, the choice to decide 
where to live, likely bolsters the enjoyment of life. As stated in Godbout v Longueuil, [1997],  
choosing where to live is a fundamentally personal endeavour, implicating the 
very essence of what each individual values in ordering his or her private affairs; 
that is, the kinds of considerations [one contemplates when choosing a residency] 
serve to highlight the inherently private character of deciding where to maintain 
one’s home. In my view, the state ought not to be permitted to interfere in this 
private decision-making process, absent compelling reasons for doing so. 
Moreover, not only is the choice of residence often informed by intimately 
personal considerations, but that choice may also have a determinative effect on 
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the very quality of one’s private life[…] [r]esidence determines the human and 
social environment in which an individual and his or her family evolve: the type 
of neighbourhood, the school the children attend, the living environment, services, 
etc. In this sense, therefore, residence affects the individual’s entire life and 
development. (para. 68)  
Although the conclusions and interpretations drawn in Godbout v Longueuil, [1997] might 
give off the impression that with the right lawyer one might be able to get away with almost 
anything, there are an array of limits which exist to exercising your right to “liberty” in the 
context of personal autonomy. For example, in B. (R.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan 
Toronto, [1995] parental autonomy was argued to be out of the scope of “liberty.”  While, B. (R.) 
v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] in its first read, is somewhat 
convoluted for the fact that it contemplates the potential infringement of three Charter sections 
(sections 1, 2, and 7), for the purpose of this specific discussion, it is particularly meaningful to 
know the outcomes in relation to section 7. The appellants in this case, a couple, were practicing 
Jehovah Witnesses. Their child was born prematurely and underwent numerous medical 
procedures and endured a number of health conditions which according to doctors demanded a 
blood transfusion for the infant’s continued survival. As practicing Jehovah Witnesses, it went 
against their religion to permit doctors to administer a blood transfusion to their infant. The 
Provincial Court granted the Children’s Aid Society a 72-hour wardship to perform the 
procedure. In B. (R.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995], the SCC 
concluded that there is a sphere of protected parental autonomy including choices about a child’s 
health, education, etc. Nonetheless, the state can intervene where parental decision making 
threatens a child's autonomy or health. For those reasons, the appeal was dismissed.  
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Legalization or criminalization of an act can, in effect, alter the outcomes of SCC decisions 
relating to any Charter right. In the context of “liberty” (in section 7), the legalization of 
marijuana helped the criminal justice system learn about the flexibilities in decision making 
when an act is legal compared to when it is criminalized. For example, in R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. 
v. Caine, [2003] it was established that lifestyle choices such as the use of illegal substances are 
not protected by section 7. Malmo-Levine and Caine both whom of which were charged with 
either trafficking marijuana or the possession of marijuana (remember, marijuana was illegal in 
2003) argued that (a) marijuana was central to Malmo-Levine’s lifestyle (as a marijuana/freedom 
activist); and (b) according to Caine’s defense, the choice to smoke marijuana is synonymous 
with the choice for example, to eat fatty foods on occasion – a fundamentally unhealthy choice 
but one that doesn’t cause irreversible, immediate, devastating impacts to one’s overall health 
and safety. The SCC determined that if a criminal law is shown to be arbitrary or irrational, it can 
infringe on section 7. Nonetheless, it was decided that section 3(1) (possession) and 4(2) 
(trafficking) of the Narcotics Control Act were neither of these criteria (R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. 
v. Caine, 2003, para. 136). The law was considered reasonable because the consequences 
associated with individual use can become collateral damage aimed at the public – a public 
protection too vital to discount. The general concerns the court had related to conveyances under 
the influence, were using complex machinery under the influence, the consequences of chronic 
use, or the accessibility to vulnerable groups such as youth or pregnant women.  
This argument serves as foundational to any argument that possession of any illegal drug 
infringes on someone’s Charter right. If one were to advance the same argument but in the 
context of possession of methamphetamine, this case would likely be pulled as precedent in 
order to demonstrate why there is no infringement against section 7 specifically. What becomes 
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interesting is the adaptability of the Charter as a purposive document so to become relevant for 
instances in which, for example, marijuana in legalized.  
In R v Smith, [2015], the Court was able to identify reasons as to why the partial 
decriminalization of recreational marijuana use was unconstitutional for it put users in a 
conflicting spot. In 2015, only the possession of limited amounts of dried marijuana for medical 
purposes had been decriminalized. Accordingly, at the time, non-dried marijuana derivatives, 
were still illegal and Smith was charged for possession with purpose of trafficking cannabis 
topical ointments and edibles (non-dried marijuana products); a product he produced privately in 
which he didn’t use personally but, sold. Smith argued that this was an infringement on his 
section 7 rights, specifically his right to liberty because the system was “foreclosing reasonable 
medical choices [via the threat of criminal prosecution as well as,] by forcing [individuals] to 
choose between a legal but[,] inadequate treatment or an illegal more effective [treatment]” (R v 
Smith, 2015 SCC 34). The SCC concurred there was an infringement against section 7. By 
specifying the harmful health impacts (e.g. bronchitis or lung cancer) dried cannabis can have on 
a human compared to that of non-dried cannabis treatments, the SCC it was unreasonable to 
force users to decide between a blatantly better alternative to dried cannabis which was illegal 
and a legal but ineffective option.   
When considering both of these cases, it is possible to dissect the somewhat timeless 
qualities of the Charter. In the former case, we read a decision that although, is outdated in the 
sense it’s protecting a since then, decriminalized act, it’s relevant for its contributions to further 
understanding section 7. Additionally, it sets precedent by demonstrating why the lifestyle choice 
to engage in drug use is not an infringement of one’s section 7 rights. Moreover, we recognize an 
adaptive and evolving application of the Charter in the latter case. For when more information 
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became available and Parliament made the decision to legalize marijuana, the choice was guided 
by an array of research suggesting that the criminalization of marijuana was obsolete. For 
example, it was later learned that prosecutions for possession of marijuana tended to clog the 
internal organs of criminal justice system, marijuana itself had minimal impacts on human health 
in comparison to other drug and alcohol consumption, it proved to be a method of relief for 
chronic pain and health conditions making its use widely endorsed by the medical community, 
etc. The underlying point here, is that with this information, the SCC was able to arrive at a more 
progressive decision in R v Smith, [2015] revolving around the use of marijuana without terribly 
contradicting itself in their R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] decision.  
 
“Security” 
 The concept of allowing people a more effective, but illegal alternative to a certain 
condition or phenomenon discussed in R v Smith, [2015] also ties into “security” of the person. 
Broadly speaking, the right to “security” encompasses security of the person in a physical and 
psychological sense and the right to protect the security of one’s bodily and mental integrity. In a 
physical sense whereby, state action puts the person’s health at risk or otherwise impairs it, this 
is a classified section 7 matter (R v Monney, 1999 1 SCR 652).  For example, one should never 
be subject to baseless medical procedures where consent is absent (R v Morgentaler, 1988 1 SCR 
30) or be subject to suffering, physical punishment, etc. (Singh v Minister of Employment and 
Immigration, 1958 1 SCR 177). Furthermore, security of the person not only encircles personal 
autonomy and control of one’s integrity but, “the provision of necessaries for its support” (Singh 
v Minister of Employment and Immigration, 1958 1 SCR 177). There is really no case that 
pointedly declares “this is what security of the person is and this is what it is not.” Neither does 
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the precedent related to “life” and “liberty” provide such lucidity. In order to give the right of 
security of the person some meaning, it’s important to analyze the use of the right as 
implemented at trial. 
 R v Morgentaler, [1988] is a landmark case relevant to section 7 of the Charter. The 1985 
version of the C.C.C. contained a law (sec. 251) that prohibited abortion and the procurement of 
abortion except where life or the health of a woman were endangered. With the conviction that 
the abortion laws at the time were amiss, the appellants (three duly qualified doctors) set up their 
own private practice in which they would provide abortions to women whom were seeking an 
abortion without a certificate from a therapeutic abortion committee of an accredited hospital or 
clinic, an act criminalized under section 251(4) of the C.C.C. at the time. When brought to trial, 
one of the questions became whether or not section 251 and 251(4) infringed section 7 of the 
Charter. The SCC did determine that section 251 was indeed an infringement of section 7 rights. 
Mainly in the context of security of the person because an undesired pregnancy and the 
subsequent inability to receive a timely abortion put women in a precarious physical 
psychological state whereby, they may seek illegitimate and unsafe methods of performing an 
abortion. Additionally, the psychological stress which is state imposed as a result of untimely 
board approvals for an abortion and non-obligatory existence of boards to go before in the first 
place, etc. Mental anguish as an aspect of the right to “security” was a new idea at the time.  
 R v Rodriguez [1993], is also a landmark case and one that received a significant amount 
of attention. Rodriguez was terminally ill with a degenerative neurological disease and would 
slowly start losing control of almost all bodily functions including walking, eating, and breathing 
on her own. She was only expected to live for another 2-14 months. Rodriguez wanted to enjoy 
her life as long as physically possible but, when it got to a point she could no longer enjoy her 
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life, she wanted a physician to set-up the means by which she could take her own life, on her 
own time, while still physically capable. She argued that section 241 of the C.C.C., which 
prohibited physician-assisted suicide, was an infringement on her section 7 rights. With a 5-4 
judgement, the SCC was split right down the middle. The majority held that there was an 
infringement on section 7 because the physical and psychological state in which Rodriguez was 
doomed for would absolutely offend her section 7 Charter right but, the law was found to be in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice which will be discussed below.  
The dissenting opinion in this case is argued by many legal experts to be far more rational 
and logically founded. The dissenting opinion posited that like, the majority, there was an 
infringement of section 7 which was unjustified under section 1 (Oakes, also discussed below). 
The dissent argued that the principles of fundamental justice being protected by section 241 were 
not sufficient to override the appellants rights and that there were many safeguards available in 
the C.C.C. to meet the concerns regarding the decriminalization of the law.  
The Code provisions, supplemented, by way of remedy, by a stipulation 
requiring a court order to permit the assistance of suicide in a particular case 
only when the judge is satisfied that the consent is freely given, will ensure that 
only those who truly desire to bring their lives to an end obtain assistance. 
(Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General), 1993 3 SCR 519) 
 R v. Monney [1999], strikes a different balance demonstrating that self-induced 
physical/psychological harm must be identified and made distinct from state-imposed harm. 
Monney swallowed heroin tablets before arriving by commercial flight at Toronto Pearson 
International Airport. His hastily purchased plane ticket combined with his known stop in 
Switzerland (a known narcotic-transit country) out of Ghana (a known narcotic-sourcing 
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country) raised red flags for Customs officers. Monney couldn’t get his story straight when 
interrogated by officers and these factors gave the officer sufficient grounds to detain the 
traveller. In detention he was requested to provide a urine test or provide a stool sample – after of 
which he could be released if he was cleared. Initially Monney refused to provide the samples 
but after corresponding with his lawyer, Monney later provided a urine sample which tested 
positive for heroin. Monney was arrested and confessed to ingesting heroin tablets. Instead of 
bringing Monney to a medical facility, the officers kept him detained with intention of getting 
him medical attention only if he requested it or appeared to be in physical distress which 
correlated with proper policy/protocol. The officers diligently checked-in on Monney and 
regularly asked him if he’d like to seek medical assistance. He declined every time. Upon appeal 
he argued that his section 7 rights were infringed, for the officers didn’t provide him constant 
medical supervision during his detention. The SCC dismissed this argument, explaining that the 
self-induced nature of the medical circumstances as well as the proper protocol practiced by the 
officers in which they regularly offered the services of medical aid, did not constitute a section 7 
Charter infringement (R v Monney, 1999 1 SCR 652).   
 Similar in principle to the case above, the SCC has determined that sufficient casual 
connections must exist in order to prove that an impediment on security of the person is state-
imposed. For example, in Blencoe v British Columbia (High Rights Commission), Blencoe, a 
serving British Columbia (BC) minister, was accused of sexual harassment by one of his 
assistants. He was subsequently removed by the incumbent premier from both the provincial 
cabinet and NDP caucus. Following his dismissal, two more accusations were made against the 
ex-minister for another two counts of sexual harassment. The media attention dedicated to the 
story inhibited his “employable” status, nor did he re-run for office, and he suffered from severe 
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depression. At trial, Blencoe argued that his section 7 rights had been infringed because the delay 
in proceedings at Blencoe’s expense and as insitgated by BC, were argued to cause serious 
psychological damage to Blencoe. The courts dismissed this claim on the basis that there was no 
sufficient causal connection between the delay in proceedings employed by BC and his 
depression. 
 
“The principles of fundamental justice”  
The last component of section 7 are the “principles of fundamental justice.” Everyone is 
entitled to the rights of life, liberty, and security except in accordance with these principles. In 
other words, where a deprivation of one of the three rights allotted by the section is proven, 
counsel must also prove that the deprivation is contrary to these principles (Evans, 1991, p. 55). 
For a rule to be considered a principle of fundamental justice, it must be (1) a legal principle; (2) 
found to carry social consensus about the way in which society need to function candidly; and 
(3) sufficiently specific and unambiguous to enable proper application (R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. 
Caine, 2003, para. 113). Bowles (2019), explains that these principles bear an array of 
definitions and that they have been applied in various manners, which has created difficulty for 
the courts in acuminating a precise and fixed interpretation of the principles (p. 10). Both 
substantive and procedural fundamental principles exist under the section. Substantive principles 
essentially deal with societal vs individual interest and how a socially backed sentiment will 
likely trump an individual’s belief that the socially backed sentiment directly infringes their right 
life, liberty, and/or security. Procedural principles are facets of how the justice system has been 
or ought to be functioning or “the common law duty of procedural fairness” (Procedural…, 
2019). Both substantive and procedural principles are shaped by the cases and traditions that 
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have long been a valued feature of Canadian law and society (Canadian Foundation for 
Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada, 2004, para. 8). It has been argued that the SCC has been 
hesitant to provide definitive interpretations of the principles of fundamental justice because this 
will allow for a broad and timeless interpretation of the principles moving forward (Bowles, 
2019, p. 46) 
There are a considerable number of principles of fundamental justice which have to date, 
been recognized by the SCC. It is out of this thesis’s scope to provide a detailed analysis of 
where these principles are derived from and how the courts attempt to apply them. However, to 
give some insight into the principles, an exhaustive list of the principles will be provided and 
then two case studies will be explored. One demonstrates the application of a substantive 
principle, and the other demonstrates the application of a procedural principle. Additionally, 
when applying section 320.17 (2) to section 7 below, the principles of fundamental justice will of 
course be examined.  
Substantive principles of justice include arbitrariness; gross disproportionality (see above 
R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine); moral blameworthiness; overbreadth (see above R v Heywood 
or R v Demers); and vagueness. Procedural principles of justice include best evidence rules; 
presumption of innocence; right of silence; right to full answer and defense; and right to full 
disclosure. Some of the principles are no doubt utilized more often than others but, each and 
every one of the principles have been considered by the SCC in at least one case. 
In R v. Clay [2003], the accused had been charged with possession with the purpose of 
trafficking marijuana. He owned an Ontario-based marijuana ‘accessories’ shop, but also sold 
cannabis seedlings. Clay sold the seedlings and a plant clipping to an undercover police officer 
and was subsequently arrested and charged. Clay’s defense was that where the prohibition of 
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marijuana can result in a prison sentence, his section 7 rights were evoked and the law, as argued 
by Clay, was overly broad. In this case, the course to arrive at a decision, was very linear (i.e. the 
SCC’s logic and reasoning are easy to follow). The SCC contended that while a possession 
charge does threaten a person’s liberty by possibly accompanying a prison sentence, the 
deprivation of such is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. No narrower 
prohibition would be as effective as the current possession and trafficking laws. The law was not 
considered by the SCC to exhibit any degree of overbreadth or gross disproportionality. The 
SCC referenced R v. Heywood [1994] (as discussed earlier) to rationalize their decision, stating if 
the logic in Clay’s defense were upheld by the courts, policymakers would have very little room 
to legislate; this precedent would become a serious obstacle for Parliament. Overbreadth fits 
within the domain of Oakes Test where the question of “minimal impairment” is appraised.  
R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme [1991], is an excellent showcase of how the right to a full 
answer and defense can be argued in the context of fundamental justice’s principles. Seaboyer 
had been charged with sexual assault. At the trial, the defense was refused the opportunity to 
cross-examine the complainant. Seaboyer on appeal argued that this was unjust, and he wasn’t 
permitted an opportunity to uncover whether or not the injuries (bruises, marks, etc.) in which 
the complainant brought into evidence were as the result of other sexual encounters the woman 
could have engaged in, in the recent past. Gayme on the other hand, who was 18 at the time of 
the offense, had been charged with sexual assault where he had engaged in sexual relations with 
a 15-year-old and was under the honest assumption that it was a consensual encounter. Gayme 
contended that the complainant was the aggressor and Gayme’s counsel intended on cross-
examining the girl to attempt to prove sexual aggression in past relationships. Section 276 and 
277 (the Rape Shield Law) prevented the two appellants from cross-examining the complainants 
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in their trials. Both accused appealed to the SCC on the ground they were deprived the right to a 
full answer and defense and that sections 276 and 277 infringed their section 7 and 11 rights.  
The appeal was dismissed but the SCC concurred that section 276 violated sections 7 and 
11 of the Charter. In was determined that section 277 required evidence relating to the 
complainant’s credibility be excluded and the SCC did not see that as inconsistent with the 
constitution. Nevertheless, section 276 proclaimed certain evidence which could potentially be of 
value to a full defense, as inadmissible. The main issue for the Court, as noted by the SSC in 
these instances, is that they must weigh the “value of evidence against its potential prejudice” (R. 
v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme, 1991, p. 580). This becomes difficult because it is critical that all 
pertinent evidence makes it into a trial so that there is transparency surrounding the facts and the 
innocent are not being wrongfully convicted. Essentially, the SCC contended that although the 
law sought to “abolish outmoded, sexist‑based use of sexual conduct evidence,” it exceeded its 
target objective by having the potential to exclude evidence that could be critical to an honest 
defense. In the opinion of the court, the law could not be saved under section 1 of the Charter.   
The takeaway from R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme, [1991] is that laws which constrain 
attempts to admit evidence are likely going to be constitutionally challenged. Where a section 7 
breach exists, this can be addressed in the “principles of fundamental justice” argument. Where 
life, liberty, or security are not being threatened, but one’s right to fair trial is being infringed on, 
section 11 of the Charter will be relevant. For reasons that become apparent below, the right to a 
full answer and defense are brought into disrepute with the enforcement of section 320.27 (2) of 
the C.C.C. in the context of the principles of fundamental justice within section 7 of the Charter.   
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The Law and Section 7 
 
Does section 320.17 (2) of the Canadian Criminal Code infringe on section 7 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms? 
 
 In order to understand what freedoms section 320.27 (2) might infringe on, we need a 
grasp on what actions are explicitly being prohibited by the law. It has been established that the 
new law is an agent to deter impaired driving. The intended outcome of this law is theoretically 
achieved because the reasonable person opts not to drive when impaired because the odds of him 
or her getting screened for impaired driving have dramatically increased. The differentiation is 
made whereby the odds of being pulled-over are probably about the same as before but, the odds 
of being screened for alcohol are likely much closer to every time you get pulled over. Impaired 
driving has for a long time been prohibited by the law but, what the law has inherently done here 
is influenced the public’s perception of their risk of being caught. Therefore, no act is really 
being prohibited by the law relative to the last version of it. Nonetheless, an act is being 
supported, an act carried out by law enforcement, and this notion becomes pivotal to the point.  
 
Applying Life, Liberty, & Security 
  
 A well-articulated discernment ought to be made to resolve the true differences in the 
legislation as opposed to its predeceasing law. A distinct modification has been initiated by 
Parliament where the ways in which the public interact with law enforcement on the roads have 
drastically changed. R v Ladouceur [1990] and R v Hufsky [1988] have settled disputes 
referencing random roving stops and random check stops; both have been legally justified by the 
SCC. However, how these random stops materialize as a result of the new law’s application has 
changed significantly.  
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Where a random stop lawfully occurred during the old law’s era, an officer would only be 
able to act based on what he could infer to be true as informed by his senses: sight, smell and 
hearing. For example, someone who were pulled over by an officer would be obliged, without 
warrant to produce their licence, registration, and insurance because these documents imply that 
the driver has met the requirements backed by law, which require that one prove their ability to 
operate a conveyance safely (R v Hufsky, 1988, para. 23). Moreover, if an officer were to, for 
example, observe a broken break light or a smashed windshield (whatever the apparent 
mechanical issues might be), whether it be prior to being pulled over or during the commission 
of a roadside stop, the officer would be permitted to investigate this and potentially issue a fine 
(R v Ladouceur, 1991, p. 1280). The officer cannot begin opening your vehicle’s hood or 
crawling under your vehicle to inspect it for issues, but for the most part whatever the officer can 
discern from a face-value engagement may be followed through on. Although these acts have 
been acknowledged to engage certain sections of the Charter, it has been determined that driving 
is a privilege and that the public can afford to relinquish to some extent, their civil liberties for 
the protection of the collective.  
 Nevertheless, in the past people could be pulled over for these reasons (documentation, 
mechanical issues, etc.) and if there was evidence that another offence had occurred or was in 
progress, an officer could act accordingly. For example, the smell of marijuana wafting out of a 
vehicle would give the officer reasonable grounds to suspect that the driver (or passengers) were 
smoking marijuana (see above R v Malmo-Levine; R v Caine, 2003). Or like established in 
Deadman v The Queen [1985], the detection of the smell of alcohol coming off someone’s breath 
would also provide reasonable grounds to administer a breathalyzer test to attempt to corroborate 
the suspicion. This exact point sets up the quandary regarding enforced random mandatory 
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alcohol screening. The act of driving impaired can be criminally prosecuted and where the step 
of collecting evidence is removed from the investigatory measures, serious implications 
surrounding someone’s rights arise.  
 The decision to prosecute someone and charge them criminally is a significant and 
weighty pursuit. It must demand the upmost care and demonstrated responsibility because the 
repercussions of a successful conviction can be severely life-altering. Where at stake is a 
criminal record or a life-long prison sentence, every outcome could possibly be seriously 
detrimental to the accused and their enjoyment of life. When the new law didn’t exist, outcomes 
were pretty straightforward. For example, you might get randomly pulled over and where 
documentation/ mechanical soundness checked out, you’d be on your way as long as you had 
given the officer no reason to believe something else illegal was ensuing. However, if for 
example we assume that documentation or the mechanical fitness of your vehicle did not check 
out, these are not criminal offenses in Canada. Serious consequences can arise out of not abiding 
by these laws, but a criminal record is not at stake.  
 Contrast to this, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs is indeed a criminal 
offense. Section 320.27 (2) has introduced the possibility of being convicted of such an offense 
without any sort of investigation supporting the contention that someone is guilty of such. The 
safety net which required a law enforcement officer to establish reasonable grounds in order to 
investigate as to whether or not the operator of a vehicle was impaired has been eliminated 
entirely. Essentially, random mandatory alcohol screening can be attributed to three possible 
outcomes, (1) best case scenario, the individual in question blows under the legal limit and is 
permitted to drive off-site; (2) the individual blows over the legal limit and is subsequently 
arrested under section 320.14 (1) of the Code and are then subject to a punishment ranging from 
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a minimum fine of $1000 to a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison, as established in section 
320.19 (1) of the C.C.C.; or (3) the individual in question opts not to comply and is therefore 
charged under section 320.19(4) (Canadian Criminal Code, 1985).  It may be very confusing for 
an individual who is being pulled over and is thereafter demanded to provide a breath sample. 
Especially when the opportunity has arisen for which he or she might be criminally charged and 
no protections are provided to that individual when placed in that very precarious situation, 
including the right to consult counsel (CBC News, 2018, para. 10). For example, someone who 
hasn’t been drinking and is under the impression they don’t have to provide a breath test because 
there is no reason for the police to investigate the ‘facts’ of such a crime, which hasn’t even been 
committed, will be subject to a criminal charge. Wherein every other Canadian criminal pursuit, 
reasonable grounds is a condition of investigation, Canadians have regretfully been stripped of 
their right to this due process.  
Reasonable grounds is largely associated with section 8 of the Charter where individuals 
are protected against unreasonable search and seizure. It could very well be argued that section 8 
of the Charter is violated by section 320.27 (2) of the law (CBC News, 2019, para. 13). 
However, this would undoubtedly be a challenge, for it would require that it be proven breath is 
a matter which can be searched and/or seized. Other Charter sections would most likely afford an 
increased probability of success in proving the law unconstitutional. Nonetheless, the skipped 
step in the investigatory measures as permitted by section 320.27 (2) opens the gate for a section 
7 infringement.  
Wayne MacKay who is a law professor at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Canada and a 
Charter expert claims “in a strictly charter sense it is a greater limit on one’s liberty under section 
7 and it does put greater limits on one’s freedom of movement, freedom of one’s ability to say no 
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or not to be invaded in some way by the state” (Rankin, 2019, para. 3). Earlier, some examples 
were provided that demonstrated the implementation of section 7 in the context of liberty. As a 
refresher, there are in essence two rights that are protected by this right, the right against being 
physically restrained or the threat of physical restraint and the right to make inherently private 
choices without state interference which represents a right to personal autonomy. Relevant to this 
argument, in R. v. Vaillancourt [1987], the SCC expressed that, where an offense accompanies 
the possibility of imprisonment, corollary to a conviction, a section 7 matter is activated, and the 
court will then entertain the issue of principles of fundamental justice (para. 26). It is not difficult 
to prove that someone’s right to life, liberty, or security is being violated. However, that the 
violation is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice will be more burdensome to 
prove. 
As aforementioned, there are two outcomes derivative of section 320.27 (2) that pose a 
threat to someone’s’ liberties. Opting not to comply or blowing over the legal limit are both 
possibilities that can arise out of the application of the new law. In both of those instances, 
imprisonment is realistically, a consequence as provisioned under sections 320.15 (1) and 320.19 
(1) (Criminal Code, 1985). Furthermore, R v Saul [2015], which was a case tried by the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal, poses an interesting question in contemplating the issue of impaired 
driving. In R v Saul [2015], it’s established that the act of bolus: “the consumption of a large 
amount of alcohol within 30 minutes of the alleged driving offence,” with little to no doubt 
renders the assumption that this act is “reckless and morally culpable.” There exists an almost 
indisputable intent to drive intoxicated. However, where someone blows just over the legal limit 
or close to, difficulty can arise in determining mens rea which is a pillar of conviction in Canada. 
“If someone truly is not impaired[,] due to the absence of an elevated BAC and the incomplete 
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absorption of alcohol, then how is the conduct morally culpable? A person is now impugned as a 
criminal on the basis of drinking in such a manner that renders them not impaired and not over 
the limit” (Lee, n.d. 6). 
 
 Randomness  
Also, worth mentioning and relevant to section 320.27 (2) of the C.C.C. is the concept of 
“randomness.” The SCC has discussed the notion of “randomness” in the context of traffic stops 
and has adjudged that random stops/check stops are not a violation of the constitution as 
discussed earlier. However, there is a legitimate concern that the new law abets stops that are in 
no way random.  R v Ladouceur [1990] compares the potential intrusiveness of both roving stops 
and check stops (p. 1267). The SCC contended that the unlimited power to conduct a stop 
wherever an officer feels so inclined, is ultimately more intrusive than a check stop (R v 
Ladouceur, 1990, p. 1267). For example, law enforcement officers who are capturing speeders 
via photo radar will likely be strategic in where they park to ensure lucrative results. Or other 
officers may lurk in areas where U-turns are common. There is really no limit to how, in the 
commencement of roving stops, officers will be strategic in detection. Nevertheless, this was 
condoned by the SCC.  
Section 320.27 (2) has the potential to escalate the strategic placement of officers for the 
purpose of attempting to apprehend as many violators of a law as possible. There is very little 
doubt surrounding the notion that law enforcement officers will flock to bars, restaurants, pubs, 
etc. Essentially, any place where it is known that the public congregates to drink, officers may 
position themselves in a manner to which they can witness patrons of the establishment leaving 
and getting into their cars. Arguably, the officer is “poaching” people as they leave areas which 
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have a reputation for increasing the odds that the driver is impaired. This is different from 
waiting for someone to conduct a U-turn, run a red light or speed because the intention to visit 
such an establishment should not be confused with the intent to drink and drive. This makes 
those who frequent these types of businesses, more susceptible to coming into contact with a law 
enforcement officer and this is in no way random. It is not to say that those who frequent these 
types of establishments are vulnerable people and require protection. Nonetheless, “randomness” 
should distribute the probability of being pulled over and engaging with an officer equally 
amongst all of the public. Sopinka, J. rationalizes an approval for random roving stops in stating 
that for example, 1 in 37 drivers in Ontario are said to be driving without a valid driver’s licence 
(R v Ladouceur, 1990, p. 1267). From there the SCC infers that where an officer is conducting 
random stops, every 37th driver will likely not bear a valid driver’s licence. This logic would 
insinuate that random stops occur whereby every single driver has the same opportunity of being 
pulled over. The freedoms awarded to law enforcement officers in order to administer random 
mandatory breathalyzer tests without reasonable grounds will absolutely invite officers to lurk 
outside of the appropriate businesses or areas and target a very specific group of people.  
 
The Principles of Fundamental Justice and the Law 
Where it has been established that one’s right to liberty has been infringed on, the 
impugned law must be proven to coincide with the principles of fundamental justice. In order for 
an officer to administer a screening device, they must have one on them. Alcohol screening 
devices (ASD) and their now mandated administration offer a number of issues. Firstly, by 
omitting reasonable grounds as a precondition to administering a random mandatory breath test, 
admissibility of ADS results have basically become guaranteed. Although proof must be 
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admitted demonstrating that the ASD was calibrated, there is almost no opportunity allotted by 
the law to dispute the ASD’s reading. The new law “gives an officer unassailable grounds to 
demand a breath sample. Thus, the Charter-compliance of the breath demand will also no longer 
be in issue, meaning that the breath samples will be presumptively admissible and not subject to 
challenge” (Leamon & Lee, n.d., p. 5). This should raise concern especially where the option to 
deny a breathalyzer test and request an alternative means of testing has been eliminated.  
Moreover, those with disabilities or compromised lung capacity, and who will not be able 
to produce a viable sample are subject to criminal charges for failing to satisfy the officers 
requirements as mandated by section 320.27 (2). The argument raised by Leamon and Lee (n.d.) 
which was established by the SCC in R v Alex, [2017], make a strong point contending that 
between the absence of disclosure rights which would otherwise enable someone to challenge a 
breath test reading, the arbitrary lowering of the standard for which one can blow (at or above 
standard), a new found inability to argue intervening consumption, increased sentences, 
mandatory minimums, and mandatory alcohol screening all work together to practically 
guarantee a conviction (p. 5). Without any opportunity to dispute the ways in which the 
altercation arose, how the test was administered, what the test read; combine that with the 
stripped right to obtain a different means of demonstrating blood alcohol content (BAC), the 
individual is deprived of the opportunity to provide the courts with a full answer and defense.  
Even more concerning, this is then exacerbated whereby section 320.27 (1) removes any 
type of intervening consumption defense and the onus is then put on the individual being charged 
to prove that they did not consume prior to a drive, but rather after they arrived at their 
destination (Flanagan, 2019, para. 8). This, as will become apparent below in discussing Oakes, 
infringes on one’s right to being presumed innocent until proven guilty (as granted by section 
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11(d) of the Charter). Criminal defense lawyer Michael Spratt also makes a startling allegation: 
When the onus is on you to prove contrary to what the Crown claims, you absorb the costs 
associated with bringing in a qualified toxicologist to speak to the facts of the case (Flanagan, 
2019, para. 9). Virtually, every opportunity to provide a full answer and defense have been 
confiscated by lawmakers. There is practically no way to dispute an allegation if the individual 
blows over the legal limit as prescribed by law.      
Overbreadth would likely be proposed by a true litigation team as an accordant principle 
of fundamental justice. However, for the purpose of submitting an all-encompassing argument, 
the question of the Oakes Test is discussed below and the analyses contemplates the notion of 
“minimally impairing” as a facet of Oakes. Overbreadth is noted in that context instead of within 
the principles of fundamental justice. However, it should be distinguished that the principles of 
fundamental justice are entirely separate from the Oakes Test and warrant separate reasoning for 
both questions. In addition to this, the SCC has also stated that after a section 7 infringement has 
been established, saving the law under Oakes is to a great degree, difficult (Section 1 
considerations…, 2019).   
 
The Oakes Test 
 Where it has been established that a Charter infringement has ensued, a party may raise 
Oakes, or in other words, the section 1 Charter test. In the law community, the Oakes Test has 
the reputation for stopping a good Charter defense right in its tracks. Many strong Charter 
defenses meet their match when the Oakes Test is applied. Nonetheless, the Oakes Test and 
section 1 of the Charter are not to be undervalued. Section 1 of the Charter is fundamental to 
what the Charter seeks to protect, for it is the mechanism that favours and protects society as a 
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whole in contrast to the Charter’s claimed purpose which, in essence, protects individual rights 
from unreasonable state action (Hunter et al. v Southam Inc. 1984). Section 1 demands that these 
individual rights guaranteed by the Charter are balanced against the need to safeguard society (as 
discussed above). Although the Charter is designed to protect a broad range of rights, each and 
every one of these rights yield to section 1 of the Charter. The Oakes Test is the agent by which 
an infringement is forced up against the pre-eminence of section 1. Section 1 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms reads as follows:  
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms 
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
The Oakes Test is applied in stages and was born out of the Supreme Court Case R v Oakes 
[1986].  
 
R v Oakes 
David Oakes was found by police to have in his possession, $150 worth of marijuana and 
over $600 in cash. Oakes was subsequently charged with unlawful possession for the purpose of 
trafficking as prohibited by section 4(2) of the Narcotics Control Act. Section 8 of the former 
Narcotics Control Act permitted courts, where it had been established that the offender was in 
possession of a narcotic, the power to try an offender for possession for the purpose of 
trafficking. In order for this charge to not become heightened to such, the accused was burdened 
with the onus of proving that he/she had no intention of trafficking the narcotic but, that they 
were only in possession of the narcotic for reasons related to themselves.  
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By the time the Oakes case reached the SCC, two legal questions were being asked: (1) 
“Does section 8 of the Narcotics Control Act violate section 11(d) of the Charter? [And] (2) is 
section 8 of the Narcotic Control Act a reasonable and demonstrably justified limit pursuant to 
section 1 of the Charter?” Oakes argued that section 8 was in direct violation of section 11(d) of 
the Charter that the law failed to honour the preconceived notion that one is innocent until 
proven guilty and that a facet of this right, requires that the Crown prove this guilt rather than 
have the accused prove their innocence. Counter to this, the Crown contended that section 8 of 
the Narcotics Control Act was a reasonable limit as prescribed by law which triggered the 
inclusion of section 1 of the Charter.  
The SCC took to the questions separately and broke down their contemplations with 
regards to each analysis at hand. Writing on behalf of the SCC, Chief Justice Dickson establish 
that section 8 includes a “reverse onus provision” meaning that the burden of proof rests on the 
defendant. Dickson substantiates this by utilizing Malaysian jurisprudence (Public Prosecutor v. 
Yuvaraj [1970]) which discusses where the burden of proof resides in criminal cases. The judge 
in that case ascertains that the burden of proof should in general never fall on the defendant and 
that where no proof or a lack of proof exists, this is cause for acquittal. Where the prosecutor 
provides enough proof to convince a court of culpability, the respondent is not obligated to 
disprove anything but, where he/she refrains from disproving anything, the respondent risks 
conviction (Public Prosecutor v Yuvaraj, 1970, p. 4).     
 Chief Justice Dickson went on to explain why section 8 violates section 11(d) of the 
Charter. With an understanding that section 11(d) is integral to the protection of section 7 of the 
Charter (life, liberty, and security), the SCC determined that the presumption of innocence as a 
staple of common law is not a unique provision in the global text. In other words, it’s a widely 
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valued right that is inherently crucial to the principle of human rights advocacy and democracy. 
The SCC in R v Oakes [1986], explained that section 11(d) requires that the respondent (a) must 
be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (b) the state bears the burden of proof; and (c)  
prosecutions must be carried out in accordance with lawful procedures and fairness” (R v Oakes, 
1986, para. 32). In considering different international statutes and jurisprudence, the SCC 
deemed section 8 of the Act to be an infringement on section 11(d) of the Charter because the 
reverse onus provision of section 8 requires a respondent to prove on a balance of probabilities 
that he or she in fact not guilty of an offense. This strips accused of the right to be presumed 
innocent. Rather they are presumed guilty of the offense until they prove them self to be 
innocent. This is directly imbalanced with the inherent principles of common law and democracy 
which coincide with values relating to human dignity and liberty.  
Finally, and what is most relevant to the purpose of this piece, is the question the SCC 
raises regarding section 1 of the Charter. The SCC sought to determine whether “s. 8 of the 
Narcotic Control Act [was] a reasonable and demonstrably justified limit pursuant to section 1 of 
the Charter” (R v Oakes, 1986, para. 62). Chief Justice Dickson explained that section 1 is only 
exercised where it has been concluded that one of the rights set out in the Charter has been 
violated. This point is essential in resolving whether or not section 320.27 (2) is a reasonable 
limit as prescribed by law, to Canadians’ rights as granted by section 7 of the Charter. It’s 
established above that there is possibly an argument for defending section 7 against that of 
section 320.27 (2) of the C.C.C. However, the procedures founded in R v Oakes which becomes 
the Oakes Test will aid in assessing the constitutionality of section 320.27 (2).  
As aforementioned, section 1 of the Charter is the gatekeeper for collective goals. It 
protects societal interest against special interest which is key to being part of a cooperative 
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civilization. Dickson recognized that there are two functions of section 1, the first being a 
guarantee of the rights and freedoms accorded by the Charter and the second being that these 
rights are not absolute as long as justified in a free and democratic society – “free and democratic 
society” being the key primary interpretation element. “The underlying values and principles of a 
free and democratic society are the genesis of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter 
and the ultimate standard against which a limit on a right or freedom must be shown, despite its 
effect, to be reasonable and demonstrably justified” (R v Oakes, 1986, para. 64).  
A reasonable limit is to be proven by the party whom of which raises the section 1 
question. The SCC determined that this must be proven by a preponderance of probabilities as 
opposed to beyond a reasonable doubt which is, as determined above, the principal unit for 
triggering a conviction in criminal law. Dickson et al. contend that the term “demonstrably 
justified” supports the proposition that a preponderance of probability analysis should be used to 
determine the success of implementation for section 1 questions. Preponderance of probability is 
also somewhat subjective in this context for there may be different degrees of probability within 
the standard itself which can fluctuate based on the nature of the case at hand. It should be made 
clear to the court the consequences of imposing or not imposing the limit as well as alternatives 
to the current law or policy in conflict with the Charter should be presented.  
In settling the question as to whether or not a Charter infringement is reasonable or not, a 
number of criteria must be met as indicated in R v Oakes, [1986]. Firstly, as illustrated in section 
1 of the Charter, the claimed infringement must be “prescribed by law.” Secondly, the potentially 
overriding law, must be of “sufficient importance.” In other words, “there [must be] a 
substantive and pressing need for the law” (King, 2018). Thirdly, the law must contend with 
what the SCC refers to as a “proportionality test” (R v Oakes, 1986, para. 70).  
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The SCC describes three components of the “proportionality test.” The first component of 
the test proclaims that there must be a rational connection between the law’s objectives and the 
measures/means adopted in the policy to reinforce the law’s objectives. Secondly, if it is 
imperative that the law prevail, it must minimally impair the individual’s Charter rights. The 
final part of the “proportionality test” requires “a favourable balance between [the] beneficial 
[and] harmful effects of the law.” King, (2018) explains “even [where the] law is minimal[ly] 
impair[ing], the benefits of the law must exceed its negative effects on individuals or groups.”  
The SCC realized that at face value, the third step comes off as redundant when compared to that 
of step one and step two. Nonetheless, the SCC stressed that although a law may be rationally 
connected to its purpose and is minimally impairing, the deleterious effects of the law must 
never outweigh the law’s importance. Where the deleterious effects of law are increasingly 
uncompromising, the importance of the law must relatively exceed this effect (R v Oakes, 1986, 
para. 72).   
In the opinion of the SCC, section 8 of the Narcotic Control Act passed the first step of the 
newfound section1 test (i.e. the Oakes Test). Dickson recognized that by passing the law, 
Parliament was attempting to tackle a compelling and vital issue. As a method of deterrence, 
Parliament intended to “curb” drug trafficking by ensuring that these kinds of acts were met 
punitively, and the SCC saw this as a meaningful approach in combatting the corruptive effect 
the drug trade had and still has on society. In deciding whether or not there was a rational 
connection between heightening a drug charge from possession to trafficking to that of 
protecting society from the serious impacts of drug crimes, the court Could not draw this 
conclusion. It was explained that for there to be a rational connection between that of the law 
itself and the purpose of the law, the law must be rationally connected in, and of, itself. Can it 
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always be inferred when someone is found to be in possession of a narcotic, that they are in 
possession with intent to traffic? The SCC didn’t find this relation to be sound. Chief Justice 
Dickson explained that where someone is found with a very small negligible amount of narcotic 
on their person, drawing to the conclusion that they possess that drug to traffic is far reaching. 
Moreover, the Court concluded that it is utterly undemocratic to convict someone of a charge for 
a law in which they may have never broken and additionally, never felt as though they had the 
capacity to defend themselves against in the first place (R v Oakes, 1986, para. 78).    
 
The Law and Section 1 
Is the infringement of section 320.27 (2) of the Canadian Criminal Code on section 7 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in a free and 
democratic society?  
 
Step One of Oakes: Sufficient Importance Test 
Earlier, it was discussed briefly about what the new conveyance law seeks to achieve. At 
face-value, the law is intended to be a mode of deterrence. Its focus is to both aid detection 
efforts dedicated to combatting impaired driving and it is a mode of deterrence through by 
fostering an overall public perception that detection is more likely than the pre-law era. 
However, in the most basic sense the law is meant to curb the very real issue of impaired driving 
in Canada. In order to establish whether or not there is a substantive and pressing need for the 
law, the SCC has prescribed a number of matters which need to be defended.  
Firstly, and as acknowledged in Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General) [2003], the 
purpose of the law must be of proven as paramount in a “free and democratic society” (para. 59). 
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In order to gauge the purposes of a law, the preamble of the associated bill usually serves as 
convenient when trying to dissect the motives behind legislating such a law. Bill C-46’s 
preamble makes some of the following points:  
Whereas dangerous driving and impaired driving injure or kill thousands 
of people in Canada every year; 
Whereas dangerous driving and impaired driving are unacceptable at all 
times and in all circumstances; 
Whereas it is important to deter persons from driving while impaired by 
alcohol or drugs; 
Whereas it is important that law enforcement officers be better equipped 
to detect instances of alcohol-impaired or drug-impaired driving and 
exercise investigative powers in a manner that is consistent with the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; 
Whereas it is important to protect the public from the dangers posed by 
consuming large quantities of alcohol immediately before driving; 
The preamble implies that there are three distinct objectives of the law: (1) to save lives and 
reduce injury; (2) to deter the public from driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs; and 
(3) to leverage detection opportunity of impaired driving through better equipping law 
enforcement officers.  
Disputing these rationales would be difficult and for good reason. Even critics of the law 
would be unlikely to disagree that these are important issues. It is truly in the best interest of 
everyone that driving is a safe undertaking. Where people make choices to compromise the 
safety of everyone on the roads, this is absolutely unacceptable in a free and democratic society. 
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The privilege associated with driving bares a considerable amount of risk. Governmental 
involvement in mitigating the chance of loss, injury, or death on the roads is to a great degree, 
essential. It has long been established that impairment behind the wheel as a result of alcohol 
consumption can severely increase the probability that an accident on the roads could occur. 
Where this can result in serious loss to property, cause injury, and in many cases, death; it is in 
the collective interest to lessen the chance of these outcomes. Impaired driving is the number one 
cause of accidents in Canada. Between 2000 and 2014, 12,000 people in Canada died as a result 
of impaired driving in that 15-year time span (2 people a day) (Impaired Driving…, 2019, p.1). 
Moreover, in 2014, 1 in 20 people reported driving impaired on at least one occasion over the 
course of that year (Clermont, 2018, p. 3). However, the majority of impaired drivers are known 
to chronically offend (Clermont, 2018, p. 4) Managing these risks are absolutely imperative in 
society. No one should die as a result of someone else’s careless and avoidable actions.  
 Alliance du personnel professionel et technique de la santé et des services sociaux v. 
Quebec [2018] reminds courts that where they are determining that an objective of a measure is 
pressing and substantive, the purpose of the law must be the objective of the measure and that 
this may differ from the wholistic objective of the legislation (para. 46). The aforementioned 
preambles are not an exhaustive list of the preambles provided in Bill C-46 but were rather the 
objectives most clearly associated with the measure in question (section 320.27 (2). In this case, 
the infringement or the purpose of the law is a heighted opportunity at being criminally 
convicted as a result of relatively more obtrusive enforcement efforts. Broadening the window 
for detection is correlated with the infringement’s objective which insinuates that driving under 
the influence will now incite a higher likelihood of prosecution and subsequently a higher 
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likelihood of deterrence in the community. In this instance, the infringement matches the 
objective of the law.  
 In addition to this, the purpose of the law must be specific, it cannot be too broad or 
overly encompassing. (Sauvé v. Canada, 2002, para. 20). In Sauvé v. Canada [2002], section 
51(e) of the Canada Elections Act denied inmates serving correctional sentences of 2 years or 
more the right to vote. It was decided by the SCC that this section violated section 3 of the 
Charter. However, section 1 of the Charter was raised as an issue. When determining whether or 
not the law was pressing and substantive, the SCC expressed skepticism directed at Parliament’s 
overly broad objectives dedicated at the measure, which more or less confiscated the right to 
vote from prisoners. The SCC explained that objectives such as (1) enhancing civic 
responsibility; and (2) to provide additional punishment targeted at convicts, are imprecise and 
vague objectives. The subjectivity that undergirds these objectives does not permit deliberation 
because no one would disagree that these virtues of the measure aren’t important. Of course, 
civil liberty and punitiveness are essential to the law. When objectives are too vague, the 
justification analysis in the courts becomes considerably more difficult.  
In regards to section 320.27(2) and the objectives related to its enforcement, the overall 
intentions to (1) save lives and reduce injury; (2) deter the public from driving under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs; and (3) leverage detection opportunity of impaired driving through 
better equipping law enforcement officers, are not overly broad. Saving lives is most definitely a 
vague and overarching objective. However, because it is accompanied by goals relating to 
deterring the public from consuming alcohol before getting into a vehicle and enabling law 
enforcement to uphold this mandate, the purposes of the law can be dissected and deliberated. 
For example, Parliament could have asserted that the objective of this measure was to “protect 
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society from the risks associated with dangerous driving” This would have been far too 
expansive and disreputable. Protecting drivers from the risks associated with dangerous driving 
are, of course, a meaningful attribute of the law but, nonetheless make it hard to determine 
whether the law is pressing or substantive because there is no certainty surrounding what exactly 
the law is attempting to protect.   
Furthermore, the purpose of the law must be the true objectives of the measures 
(Tetreault-Gadoury v. Canada, 1991, p. 42). This is to say that the party who brings forth the 
section 1 issue cannot deviate from the articulated objectives which Parliament set out to protect 
(i.e. the party cannot be inventive in proposing possible objectives of the law but should adhere 
closely to the reasons why Parliament instigated the law). This would then be a falsely derived 
motive for upholding the law. If it were not clear to politicians as to why they were creating the 
law, its place in Canadian legislation can hardly be substantive or pressing. This question is not 
relevant here because the objectives mentioned here are a reflection of the preamble which 
Parliament conceived. All of the aforementioned considerations especially, wherein people lose 
their lives to the act in which Parliament is attempting to dissuade, contribute to an overall 
conclusion that the law is of sufficient importance in supporting its objectives.  
 
Step Two of Oakes: Rational Connection 
The first step of the proportionality assessment requires that the courts establish that the 
measures mandated within the law are rationally connected to the objectives of the law (i.e. is 
the law linear in upholding its purpose). In this instance we are assessing whether or not the act 
of enforcing random mandatory alcohol screening, directly corresponds with the 
aforementioned objectives being (1) saving lives and reducing injury; (2) deterring the public 
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from driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs; and (3) leveraging detection opportunities 
of impaired driving through better equipping law enforcement officers. The SSC has 
established, whenever possible, the rational connection should be corroborated by scientific 
evidence (Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, 2013, para. 133). When it is 
not possible to consider the impugned measure empirically, “that a precise causal link for 
certain societal harms ought not to be required” rather, experiential inferences, reason, or logic 
may be established (Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, 2013, para. 132). 
Additionally, the rational connection need not be totally comprehensive. The measure doesn’t 
have to perfectly fulfill the objectives of the law but, a logical presupposition about how the 
measure, to a degree, advances the objectives of the law will abet in proving a rational 
connection (Trociuk v. British Columbia, 2003, para. 34). Supreme Court Justice Iacobucci in 
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [2000], explained that the 
“test is not particularly onerous” (para. 228).  
Canada is somewhat fortunate for the fact that this type of law has been in effect in 40 
different states worldwide and empirical evidence exists related to random mandatory alcohol 
screening and its effects on combatting the issue. In Australia, random mandatory alcohol 
screening has been a facet of traffic law since the 1980’s (Legislative Background, 2019, para. 
1). Most of the research dedicated to learning about the effectiveness of the law has come out 
of Australia. However, Ireland which has enforced random mandatory alcohol screening since 
2006 has also disseminated findings about the law and its impacts. In determining whether or 
not a rational connection can be made between the measures and the objectives of the law, both 
Australian and Irish findings will be analyzed.  
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MANDATORY ALCOHOL SCREENING 52 
In Australia, random mandatory alcohol screening has been around for decades and has 
simply been a casual aspect of traffic law enforcement. In Australia, mandatory alcohol 
screening is referred to as Random Breath Testing (RBT). In Queensland, Australia it is 
reported that after about a decade of enforcing the new (at the time) law, the Queensland Police 
Service observed an 18% decrease in “alcohol-related driving fatalities” (Hart, Watson, & Tay, 
2003, p. 137). During that same initial decade, it was reported that the Queensland Police 
Service was administering one breath test a year for every licensed driver in the state (Hart, 
Watson, & Tay, 2003, p. 137). Demonstrating serious agility in administering tests to the 
public. Other figures relating to the country’s overall numbers suggest that Australia has seen 
anywhere from a 22-42% decrease in fatal crashes as a result of impaired driving (Watson & 
Freeman, 2007, p. 12). In Ireland, mandatory alcohol testing (MAT) has been enforced since 
2006 (Solomon & Chamberlain, 2018, p. 27). During the first year of the law’s mandate in 
Ireland, fatalities resulting from a traffic incident decreased by 23% (Legislative 
Background…, 2019, para. 5). In 2015, after 9 years of applying the law, Ireland saw a 55% 
drop in traffic deaths and a 60% drop in traffic-related injuries (Solomon & Chamberlain, 2018, 
p. 27). 
However, because inciting deterrence is a main objective of the law in question, it is 
worth understanding Australian public perception of detection. In a study conducted by Watson 
& Freeman (2007), 257 out of 711 respondents reported drunk driving in the 6 months prior to 
the commencement of the survey (p. 14). Within that same group of respondents, 75.3% of 
respondents had reported seeing police conducting RBTs in the last six-months. Additionally, 
41.4% of respondents had themselves, been tested in the last six-months (Watson & Freeman, 
2007, p. 14). When respondents were asked about their perceived risk of apprehension, 40% 
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expressed that they weren’t sure what the likelihood was while 26% expressed that there was 
an unlikely to extremely unlikely chance of them being apprehended (Watson & Freeman, 
2007, p. 14).  
Where it has been established that this law and its implementation have been 
demonstrably successful in other democracies, a rational connection between the measures and 
the law’s objectives can be comfortably made. In both Australia and Ireland, it has been found 
that random mandatory alcohol testing has worked to reduce numbers related to accidents 
resulting in death or injury. Although the majority of people in Australia are not certain about 
the likelihood of detection, 75% of people reported witnessing the law being enforced and it 
would be safe to infer that those who have observed the law being actively enforced are more 
likely to be weary of detection and will act accordingly and avoid driving impaired. There is 
little doubt surrounding the notion that the law would not playout in very similar ways in 
Canada. Mandatory alcohol screening would likely (1) save lives and reduce injury; (2) deter 
the public from driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs; and (3) leverage detection 
opportunities of impaired driving through better equipping law enforcement officers in 
Canadian society.  
 
Step Three of Oakes: Minimal Impairment  
The second component of the proportionality test requires the law be proven to minimally 
impair the individuals Charter rights. The law must be as minimally impairing on an individual’s 
Charter rights as possible and where alternatives that are less invasive are available, the law 
cannot be found to be constitutional. In this instance, it must be determined whether the 
enforcement of random mandatory alcohol screening and the infringement whereby a heightened 
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threat of imprisonment is minimally impairing.  Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-Macdonald 
Corp. [2007] clarifies that Parliament is not required to implement a less effective alternative to 
the law (para. 137). Nevertheless, Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony [2009], 
explains that the minimal impairment test is not to ensure that the objective is met to the same 
degree or to the same extent as the currently legislated law, but rather that in considering the 
range of alternatives to the law, a “less drastic means of achieving the objective in a real and 
substantial manner” is not available (para. 55).  
On the issue of whether the infringement is minimally impairing, the escalation of potential 
for being criminally charged and whereby the consequence in some instances is imprisonment, 
this infringement is severely impairing. Potential outcomes which range from a criminal record 
to 10 years in prison are in no way insignificant. It can be safely inferred that the consequences 
as a result of a conviction of this nature, are severe. A solid argument demonstrating the 
overbreadth of section 320.27 (2) can quite likely be convincingly conceived. There are two very 
plausible alternatives to the law that would most definitely impair civil liberties to a lesser extent 
while meeting the objectives of the law in a real and substantial manner.  
The first being a reversion to the old law. The entirety of this thesis has practically been 
dedicated to the argument contending the old law was less invasive than the provisions Bill C-46 
now enables. Where reasonable grounds are reintroduced as a precondition to investigate an 
impaired driving violation, the public is protected from unnecessary and unwarranted state 
intrusion. The predeceasing law, for two reasons, had considerable impact on apprehending and 
reducing impaired driving incidents and therefore, were meeting the objectives of Bill C-46 in a 
real and substantial manner. For one, impaired driving rates have been on a steep decline since 
the mid 1980’s (Clermont, 2018, p. 6). This demonstrates mentionable and significant progress 
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in combatting the issue of impaired driving, on law enforcement’s behalf. A notable decline can 
be observed from the year 2011 where incidents of drunk driving have been rapidly declining 
(Clermont, 2018, p. 6). Furthermore, police officers are totally equipped to administer 
breathalyser tests where they have established reasonable grounds to investigate the suspicion. 
Extensive training provides law enforcement with the tools and skills to identify impaired or 
compromised behaviour on the roads and with the right to conduct roving stops anyways, there is 
little need for the law to mandate breathalyzing. Moreover, the standard for establishing 
reasonable grounds is exceedingly low (Leamon & Lee, n.d. p. 4). It is also significant to point 
out that Australia for example, who has reported success in reducing impaired driving rates does 
not bear a Charter equivalent (Leamon & Lee, n.d. p. 4).  
Additionally, inhibiting impaired driving to the greatest degree humanely possible, is not 
going to by any means occur immediately. It will require years of education and improvement to 
abet the measures society takes to achieve the greatest possible outcome even despite the new 
law. To believe that impaired driving will be completely wiped out at some point seems to be a 
markedly naïve assumption. There will always be members who oppose the law and lives will 
regrettably be taken by senseless acts of those who refuse to abide by the law. This is apparent in 
the context of any law which the C.C.C., has criminalized. It is not the state’s job to transform by 
some miracle, the number of these offences to zero. An aid in reduction is of course endorsed by 
society to a point that their civil liberties are not being drastically impeded on. However, we 
must cope with the notion that harmful and sometimes preventable events do transpire and the 
odds of any of us becoming victim to someone’s poor decision making is virtually the same.   
A second alternative to the law which would arguably infringe on individual rights to a 
lesser degree, would be to instead enforce a legal limit of 50 mg of alcohol in 100mL of blood. 
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To accompany their random mandatory alcohol screening laws, both Australia and Ireland (the 
case studies discussed above) enforce a legal limit of 50 mg of alcohol in 100mL of blood 
(Solomon & Chamberlain, 2018, p. 22). The fact alone causes difficulties in distinguishing 
whether or not the reported reductions in impaired driving numbers are as a result of 
implementing random mandatory alcohol screening or the remarkably lower legal limit which is 
enforced in both states. For example, in many provinces in Canada, they already enforce a 
minimum BAC of 50 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood. The administrative minimum is not a 
criminal offense but mechanisms of deterrence are enforced such as a licence suspension and the 
towing of one’s vehicle. In British Columbia, this administrative cap was said to reduce fatal 
accidents by 21%, injuries requiring medical attention by 8%, and ambulance dispatchment by 
7.2% (Fell, 2016, para. 9). If these maximums were to be criminally enforced, there is no doubt 
that impaired driving numbers would to a considerable extent, decrease.  
The two alternative measures which arguably have the potential to produce relatively 
proportionate outcomes to the one’s Bill C-46 is striving to achieve, but are significantly superior 
in protecting people’s liberties, actively demonstrate that section 320.27 (2) is not minimally 
impairing on the public’s rights. Where two alternatives have been recommended (the former 
being the least intrusive) and arguments have been supplemented to support the contention that 
these alternatives can still target the objectives set out by the law in a meaningful and significant 
manner, the impugned measure is found to be unconstitutional.  
A court would not require, where a Charter infringement has been found to be 
unreasonable, for the Oakes Test to proceed. Oakes Test is set up in a way for which every step 
of the test informs whether or not the following step would have the potential to be defended. 
Where it has been established the law is not minimally impairing, it would be obsolete to 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MANDATORY ALCOHOL SCREENING 57 
continue defending whether or not the benefits outweigh the harmful effects of the law since this 
has been determined inadvertently. 
 
Discussion 
  First and foremost, a necessary disclaimer ought to be made. The evaluation conducted in 
this piece is not precise. The formulated argument simply sets an example whereby potential 
challenges could be made in reference to section 7 and section 1 of the Charter. The findings in 
this thesis are based on an amalgamation of information including precedence derived from 
jurisprudence, research findings, and informed opinions relayed by lawyers, law professors, and 
other affluent practioners in the field. There are hundreds of plausible arguments that can be 
pursued on the basis of this law. Leamon & Lee (n.d.) suggest that there are 6 offending sections 
as a result of Bill C-46’s passing in the legislature, including sections 320.27 (2), 320.34, 320.14, 
320.19, 320.2, and 320.21 (p. 1). And all of these sections combined potentially infringe on an 
array of Charter sections including 7, 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b), 11(b), and 11(d) (Leamon & Lee, n.d., p. 
1). The focus of this paper was to consider specifically section 320.27 (2) in the context of 
section 7 of the Charter. Nevertheless, within the thesis, arguments are presented that would 
likely not be constituted as a violation of section 7, but rather one of the other Charter sections 
listed above. The point at hand, is that section 320.27 (2) is unconstitutional (disregarding 
Oakes) and the mandates provided by section 320.27 (2) are the impetus for the other sections 
being written or reformulated within the C.C.C. Where a strong defense team could prove 
section 7 in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, the likelihood of Oakes being 
raised is slim in a section 7 context; nonetheless, possible.  
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 Certainly, this challenge will be dissected, probed, and examined within the walls of the 
SCC. Born to be a landmark case, a decision surrounding the constitutionality of random 
mandatory alcohol screening will prove to be controversial and riveting. For those who garner an 
appreciation for the Charter and the role it has played in Canadian law, rationale for an eventual 
decision could not come soon enough. However, and maybe more importantly, for the general 
public, its outcome will suffice so as long as people know it was tried appropriately. Lower 
courts in Canada have begun to see challenges to the new law siphoning in, but it will be some 
time before the assumptions made within this thesis are validated or are refuted. Nonetheless, a 
glimpse into a potential outcome will serve us who are yearning for a decision, with some peace 
of mind.     
 
Conclusion 
 It is paramount that where legislators exist, judges and courts exist counter to them in 
order to ensure the public’s protection. Lawmakers are proficient in their own field of expertise 
and the humanness of the system allows for mistakes to happen. The courts offer checks and 
balances to lawmakers in order to guarantee laws align with the values entrenched in democracy. 
Like how lawyers and judges are typically not excellent lawmakers, lawmakers are sometimes 
not excellent judges. Having somewhat of a grasp on why section 320.27 (2) of the C.C.C. is 
potentially unconstitutional is important to ensure the public is secure from the sometimes-
overbearing qualities of government. Whether directly or indirectly, every single person within 
Canada has a stake in the outcome of all court decisions. The way the law is written, practiced, 
and sometimes disputed effects each and every single one of us.  
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 The findings in this thesis suggest that there is a real possibility that some of the 
adjustments to the law as prompted by Bill C-46 will be found to be unconstitutional. Whether or 
not section 7 or section 1 of the Charter are raised as challenges, the practical dilemmas that arise 
out of the law’s practice should raise red flags. Issues such as the threat of a criminal record or 
even more startling, the threat of imprisonment, are profound civil conundrums. Furthermore, the 
possibility of having almost no defense in cases where someone blows over the legal limit is 
alarming. Or, the fear that going to the bar for one drink might have serious implications on the 
way you live the rest of your life, are all serious burdens on people’s civil liberties. And in the 
simplest of terms are all unfair consequences aimed beyond the scope of those who break the 
law.  
 Areas of future study relating to the other sections besides 320.27 (2) as introduced by 
Bill C-46 and their constitutionality will be invaluable. An analysis of potential section 8 through 
11 challenges will be vital areas of study. The more information accumulated and disseminated 
now, the better set up the SCC, lower courts, and lawyers will be for adjudicating this issue as 
accurately as possible. Random mandatory alcohol screening whether perceived as a legitimate 
practice or not is a reality of our system today. The contemporary and pressing nature of the 
issue which is working to wager the public’s freedom, deserves both study in the field and 
judicial consideration.     
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